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THE RISE AND FALL OF THE BLACK KING: 
GIRARDIAN THOUGHT IN THE TRAGEDY OF MACBETH 
MATTHEW TARNOVECKY 
ABSTRACT 
Theorist René Girard, in his A Theatre of Envy: William Shakespeare (1991), creates a 
near-perfect compendium of his critical thoughts by exploring numerous plays and poems 
of Shakespeare’s. Curiously, however, the tragedy of Macbeth is left out of Girard’s many 
thorough analyses. Herein discussed is an analysis of Macbeth utilizing the Girardian 
model, intending to demonstrate that Shakespeare’s Scottish tragedy may benefit from such 
a reading as equally as the plays and poems Girard himself has already examined. By 
drawing upon the concepts generated by Girard in his Violence and the Sacred (1972), one 
may note how Macbeth is filled with the mimetic rivalries, crises of degree, and instances 
of undifferentiation that serve to propel Shakespeare’s Scotland into the throes of chaos. 
Such chaos is ultimately what constitutes both the rise and the fall of Macbeth, following 
a twisted course of events tainted with the blood and violence of sacrifice. 
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction: A History of Girardian Thought 
 
In 1972, René Girard published his resoundingly critical Violence and the Sacred. 
Within that text, Girard laid the precepts of what would become a working theoretical 
model through which he and other scholars like him might deconstruct, investigate, and 
affix concepts such as sacrifice, mimetic desire, and religious crisis to innumerable other 
texts. Yet the value of Violence and the Sacred encompasses more than its ability to serve 
as a foundation for Girard’s sacrificial model. Fortuitously, Girard himself chose to design 
that model in no small part by means of relying on famous myths already present in the 
greater discourse of literary scrutiny; myths such as those surrounding the inconstant figure 
of Dionysus or the tragic figure of Oedipus. Such myths are extremely important not only 
to Girard, who uses them as the catalysts for his thoughts, but also to any scholar who 
wishes to expand upon what Girard has begun, for by studying Girard’s ideas that scholar 
knows how to reproduce them within a text of his own choosing. 
It is perhaps ironic, then, that so few scholars have chosen to capitalize on the power 
Girard infused into the scholarly world after Violence and the Sacred was published, 
especially in regard to how the Girardian model may be utilized in the various works of
2 
Shakespeare. While a handful of scholars such as Elizabeth Rivlin, Alan Hager, David K. 
Anderson, and Laurie Osborne have seen fit to explore only select plays with Girardian 
thought as their base, far too many Shakespearean scholars have not at all shown interest 
in expanding Girard’s work into any plays. Indeed, it is hardly a conceit to acknowledge 
that it is Girard himself who has accomplished the greatest strides relating to reinforcing 
his theory into the realm of Shakespeare’s work, particularly due to his 1991 publication A 
Theatre of Envy: William Shakespeare. Almost as seminal in value as Violence and the 
Sacred all but two decades before it, A Theatre of Envy may be realistically considered 
Girard’s primary outlet for his sacrificial model into the discourse of Shakespeare studies. 
By exploring over thirteen distinct plays, as well as commentating on various sonnets and 
the famous narrative poem The Rape of Lucrece, Girard has created in A Theatre of Envy 
a near-perfect compendium of his ideas as they relate to Shakespeare’s works.  
Curiously, however, for as many famous works of Shakespeare’s that A Theatre of 
Envy does explore, it seems to entirely ignore others. Of particular consequence to all future 
arguments which will herein be explored is one play above any other: the tragedy of 
Macbeth. Rife with the necessary makings for a Girardian interpretation, Macbeth is an 
impeccable example of the dangers and consequences which sacrifice, mimetic desire, and 
religious crisis may unfold into without the proper social control that so many literary 
theories outside of Girard’s own take for granted; and more importantly, Macbeth has been 
wholly ignored by Girard and other scholars who would capitalize upon his work alike. 
Yet in spite of that lack of interest from the Girardian community, Macbeth itself can 
scarcely be described as being disregarded in recent years by the greater academic 
community. Since Violence and the Sacred was published in 1972, there have been over 
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six-hundred journal articles published featuring Macbeth as their focus. Such articles have 
varied widely in regard to scope and content, but they have nevertheless been embodied by 
a decently noticeable set of a few recurring and popular trends. 
In the past decade alone, the ever-dubious relationship between the mind and the 
body, in specific regard to one’s passions and humors, has been a domineering interest in 
a variety of literary journals. Sandra Clark’s “Macbeth and the Language of the Passions” 
(2012), Ying-chiao Lin’s “‘Every Noise Appals Me’: Macbeth's Plagued Ear” (2013), and 
Suparna Roychoudhury’s “Melancholy, Ecstasy, Phantasma: The Pathologies of Macbeth” 
(2013) are but three such articles concerned with that topic. By utilizing the natural senses 
and the maladies which might affect them, Clark, Lin, and Roychoudhury detail the 
dangers and consequences of emotional stress and melancholic behavior in the play. More 
so than that, the work of those scholars at least ostensibly appears to be guiding Macbeth 
into a series of discourses which reintroduce it to the philosophies and critical theories of 
the natural sciences. Clark in particular may be viewed as contributing to such an effort 
insomuch as she heavily calls upon the Cartesian Dualism and other theories of the mind 
designed by René Descartes long before the emergence of philosophies and critical theories 
made popular over the past sixty years. 
More unconventional work published within the past decade has centered around a 
series of fascinating endeavors to draw comparisons between Macbeth and other famous 
works of English literature, such as Serdar Öztürk’s “Two Notorious Villains in Two 
Famous Literary Works: Satan in Paradise Lost and Machbeth in Macbeth” (2009) and 
Earl Showerman’s “Shakespeare's Greater Greek: Macbeth and Aeschylus' Oresteia” 
(2011). By drawing intricate comparisons between plot, dramatic structure, and characters, 
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Öztürk and Showerman have sought to include Macbeth in the greater range of literary 
discourses. Öztürk’s work in particular is an enthralling jaunt into the realm of character 
study, as his assessment of Shakespeare’s portrayal of Macbeth and Milton’s charismatic 
yet utterly twisted portrayal of Satan in Paradise Lost is only the first of two instances 
following Rachel Trubowitz’s “‘The Single State of Man’: Androgyny in Macbeth and 
Paradise Lost” (1990) that such famous pieces of literature and their characters have been 
brought together in the past few decades. 
Yet surprisingly enough, the trend that has continuously appeared throughout 
publication over the past decade offers little in the way of pure literary study. Rather, what 
has been the reoccurring topic of interest for many scholars is an in-depth study of Macbeth 
through the lens of the play’s many theatrical and film adaptations. Such articles as Paul 
Edmondson’s “Macbeth: The Play in Performance” (2005), Kristin Noone’s “Shakespeare 
in Discworld: Witches, Fantasy, and Desire” (2010), and Jeff W. Marker’s “Orson Welles's 
Macbeth: Allegory and Anticommunism” (2013) constitute but the smallest body of 
available pieces relating to the subject of Macbeth and the performing arts. Regardless, in 
spite of the sheer number of articles pertaining to that topic, it seems unlikely that work of 
Edmonson, Noone, Marker, and their peers will ever establish a dominate position as the 
premier theme of Macbeth studies due to the inherent favor bequeathed to articles that 
choose to reflect themes of a more intrinsically literary nature. 
Ultimately, the only common trend which exists to link all the scholarship 
published on Macbeth after 1972 is the inexhaustible refusal to admit Girard’s work into 
the ever-evolving discourse on the play. Truly, such a trend is a terribly unfortunate and 
injudicious oversight; and yet it is also nevertheless a distinct opportunity to usher Macbeth 
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into a place it has never before been. By introducing Girard’s work to Macbeth, what shall 
be created for the first time is a brand new and unique sensibility through which to view 
the play. Indeed, all that shall be further proposed herein is new, and perhaps sometimes 
seemingly radical, but shall nevertheless focus on drawing Girard’s theory into Macbeth, 
a play that has already been shown to have a venerable and eclectic pedigree of study. As 
such, consequently, while A Theatre of Envy remains pivotal to Girard’s work on both 
historical and bibliographic levels, it is at this point that its usefulness entirely gives way 
to Girard’s original precepts in Violence and the Sacred. With no personal commentary on 
Macbeth of which to speak within A Theatre of Envy, there is no further reason to utilize 
it. There is, however, a more pragmatic need to briefly reflect upon the work of scholars 
such as Rivlin, Hager, Anderson, and Osborne, who have all seen fit to explore other 
Shakespeare plays through a Girardian lens by calling upon Girard’s insights. So too shall 
the exploration of Macbeth herein call upon their own insights in order to help 
contextualize Girard’s ideas, and thus will the relationship between all ideas, whether from 
Girard himself or others, be far more easily understood within Macbeth. 
Elizabeth Rivlin, in her essay “Mimetic Service in The Two Gentlemen of Verona,” 
offers a complimentary explanation to the dynamic at work in the relationship shared 
between a servant and a master. According to Rivlin, the chain that binds servant and 
master is forged by links of imitation which ultimately serve to distort the unique identity 
of one from the other. As she states, “the servant acts as his master's proxy, an iterative 
function, but one that allows him to exploit the space between will and its fruition. The 
imitative relationship of servant and master is thus informed by difference as well as 
similitude” (Rivlin 105). In other words, any differentiation between a master’s will and a 
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servant’s own desire shall eventually become too blurry due to the repetitive nature of their 
bond. For Rivlin, then, such blurring of the distinct identities between servant and master, 
and thus the desires of both parties, leads to a fundamental collapse of not only the 
servant/master system but the inherent stability that system comprises. With such stability 
no longer in place, the desires which blur servant and master give way to the particular 
rivalry which sets them apart as enemies. Such thinking must be well met, not only due to 
its own laurels as a fine argument, but because Rivlin appropriately notes how the 
interchange between desire and rivalry comes directly from Girard. Within Girardian 
mimesis, “rivalry derives not from difference but from the similitude of desire, a similitude 
that threatens to eradicate distinct identities” (114). 
Alan Hager, in his article “‘The Teeth of Emulation’: Failed Sacrifice in 
Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar,” speculates that sacrifice in Shakespeare’s Roman tragedy is 
by no means a word that may be attributed to but one or two of the play’s characters. 
Rather, Hager identifies human sacrifice “on everyone’s lips in [the] play” (Hager 54), to 
the degree that any “discussion and representation of ritual destruction of humans to 
appease the gods…pervade the drama to such an extent as to create a problem in the 
interpretation of the play” (54).  Similarly, David K. Anderson, in his article “The Tragedy 
of Good Friday: Sacrificial Violence in King Lear,” speculates that the particular acts of 
violence within King Lear represent Shakespeare’s exploitation of “a division within the 
religious culture of Jacobean England, where increasingly acts of sacrificial violence were 
challenging witnesses with an interpretive problem” (Anderson 260). Such an interpretive 
problem, Anderson argues, reveals how “persecutory violence was the point at which the 
English church confronted itself, and the often-wide gap between its ideals and its 
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practices” (260). What both Hager and Anderson offer in their arguments is more than just 
insight into the discourse of religious study; the true significance of their arguments is 
actually found in what they have inadvertently revealed about how Shakespeare’s 
characters interact with religious bodies. Whether it be a pantheon of fickle deities or the 
duplicitous teachings of an equally duplicitous church, the characters of Shakespeare’s 
plays are manacled beneath some supernatural force in such a way that the force always 
exerts a degree of control over them. 
Laurie Osborne, in her article “Crisis of Degree in Shakespeare’s Henriad,” offers 
credible assistance in rendering the Girardian concept of undifferentiation and its closely 
associated concept of crisis of degree as two separable parts of the same whole. In spite of 
Osborne’s focus on the effects of crisis as they occur in the Henry plays, she nonetheless 
observes that “according to Girard's interpretation of myth, out of the original state of No 
Difference, man established Difference through sacred violence” (Osborne 337). Not only 
is the undifferentiated “original state” the model from which a society will seek 
differentiation, it is also the source of the beneficent sacrificial rites which will maintain a 
society’s harmony and equilibrium once differentiation is found. Osborne further observes 
that “when these rites fall into disuse, the safeguards against the violent and chaotic state 
of No Difference fail; the society then suffers a crisis of Degree as all differences appear 
to vanish” (337 emphasis added). The point is clear. It is only after the differentiation of 
social categories reverts to a state of undifferentiation due to a society’s failure to maintain 
sacrificial rites that destructive violence and the crisis of degree will occur. 
Correspondingly, of what little Girard does allude to in regard to the validity of that notion, 
it is imperative to note that he argues “it is not the differences but the loss of them that 
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gives rise to violence and chaos” (Girard 51). Such violence “succeeds in destroying [more] 
distinctions, and this destruction in turn fuels the renewed violence” (49). Like the 
unfurling of a historical carpet, undifferentiation and the crisis of degree follow one another 
as a society arises, matures, and either saves itself or destroys itself based on its ability to 
recognize differentiation. Since Macbeth has neither a past history nor a future history, 
since all there is to Shakespeare’s fictional Scotland is between Act 1 and Act 5, then the 
role of undifferentiation as the progenitor of the sacrificial problem and the role of the crisis 
of degree as its bloody effect is evident. 
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CHAPTER II 
The Art of Sacrifice: A Comprehensive Presentation of Mimesis 
 
As the first two scenes of Macbeth unfurl, one is treated to a fragmented history 
quite already in progress. High upon a heath, the androgynous witches of the play riddle in 
affairs of black fortune and a battle underway, as not one but rather two of King Duncan’s 
subjects have brought rebellion to his kingdom, and “brave Macbeth” (Macbeth 1.2.16) 
has been sent to dispatch one such traitor. Of the two defectors from the Scottish crown, it 
is the latter, the Thane of Cawdor, who at present is of greater significance. That man, as 
thane, bears a particular type of subservient responsibility to the king, more clearly 
understood as the dynamic between a submissive servant to his dominant master, which he 
has forsaken in a bid for power, and which consequently conveys him no reward but his 
swift and just execution. In Act 1, Scene 2, Duncan commands Cawdor’s death sentence 
without compassion or reluctance, declaring how “No more that Thane of Cawdor shall 
deceive / Our bosom interest. Go pronounce his present death, / And with his former title 
greet Macbeth” (1.2.63-65). Such a phrase as “bosom interest” in the King’s language is 
far more particular that it at first appears, and indeed serves as the foundation for what 
Girard describes in Violence and the Sacred as an invitation to the mode of sacrifice. As 
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Girard argues, “A human being dies, and the solidarity of the survivors is enhanced by his 
death” (Girard 255); but what Girard could equally argue to the same effect is that “a 
servant dies, and the community of which that servant is a part is enhanced by his death.” 
The interplay between the individual and the state, or more appropriately between the 
servant and the master, serves as a Girardian exemplar that not only suffices in its ability 
to draw the discourse of sacrifice into Shakespeare’s Macbeth, but that does so by utilizing 
the Thane of Cawdor’s execution as a most revealing gateway. For one such as Cawdor, a 
servant who rebels against his master, the King, the erosion of distinctive identities and 
desires has already given rise to mimetic rivalry. 
 In spite of Rivlin’s excellent interpretation of the servant/master system as it may 
apply to Girard’s model of mimesis, there remains an element of sacrifice within the model 
that Rivlin neglects to explore. That element is the nature of the resolution between mimetic 
rivals. According to Girard, “all sacrificial rites are based on two substitutions. The first is 
provided by generative violence, which substitutes a single victim for all the members of 
the community. The second, the only strictly ritualistic substitution, is that of a victim for 
the surrogate victim” (269). In context, whereas Rivlin would argue that any servant 
partaking of a mimetic rivalry may end the rivalry of his own volition due to the ability of 
“servants to rearrange social identities” (106) at will, Girard’s model contends that the 
“damage” is already done at the point rivalry is established. Cawdor, unlike Rivlin’s 
servants, cannot undo what he has done; his crime of rebellion, his status as a traitor, both 
caused by his mimetic rivalry with Duncan, must reach a resolution that is based in sacrifice 
rather than a second shifting of mimetic desire leading to a new unique identity. So it is 
interesting to note, then, how the resolution of the rivalry between Cawdor and Duncan is 
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informed by both sacrificial substitutions as Girard describes them. First, as it is indeed 
Cawdor who is executed between the void in Act 1, Scene 2 where he is sentenced and Act 
1, Scene 4 where his execution is recounted by Malcolm, it is clear that Cawdor is chosen 
as the “single victim for all the members of the community;” second, that Cawdor is not 
substituted in death by a surrogate victim serves a Girardian purpose that recurs in the play 
until Malcolm’s rise to the throne in the final Scene. By sentencing Cawdor himself to 
death for inciting rebellion rather than selecting a surrogate victim in his stead, Duncan 
ensures the solidarity of his remaining subjects is maintained and the dissolution of identity 
which blurs him with Cawdor will end. Further, Duncan teaches his remaining thanes a 
potent lesson: rebellion shall not be tolerated. 
 Unfortunately, Duncan’s lesson is learned by Macbeth all too well much to the later 
terror of the people under Macbeth’s tyrannical rule. Regardless, by substituting open 
rebellion for clandestine murder, Macbeth, it must be argued, is far more capable in his 
role as Duncan’s mimetic rival than Cawdor is; yet Macbeth, who gains what Cawdor does 
not, nevertheless equally meets Cawdor’s grisly end. More importantly, the ultimate fate 
of Macbeth, just like the fate of Cawdor, serves the same purpose of restoring harmony and 
order to Scotland. In order to fully comprehend how the transition from harmony, to chaos, 
and then back to harmony is situated in Macbeth, a comprehensive examination of the 
sacrifices that take place over the play’s five Acts is most prudent. Moving beyond the 
treachery of Cawdor, it is thus sensible to take note of Macbeth’s first meeting with the 
witches, for it is during that meeting that his mimetic desire for Duncan’s throne is 
originally made manifest. 
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 In Act 1, Scene 3, the source language of Macbeth’s desire may be narrowed to 
when the witches address him prophetically, and proclaim that he is not only to be counted 
as the “Thane of Glamis” (Macbeth 1.3.46) but also the “Thane of Cawdor” (1.3.47), and 
that he “shalt be king [there]after” (1.3.48). It may seem particularly odd to some that 
Macbeth’s first inclination after hearing the witches’ claims is to be doubtful, especially 
given the subsequent events that take place in the play; yet according to Girard’s theory of 
mimesis, Macbeth acts precisely as he should. As Girard argues, the figures in a mimetic 
conflict—referred to as the “model” and the “disciple” respectively—cannot help but 
question their roles; “the model,” Girard writes, “considers himself too far above the 
disciple, the disciple considers himself too far below the model” (Girard 147). So when 
Macbeth states that “to be king / Stands not within the prospect of belief, / No more than 
to be Cawdor” (Macbeth 1.3.71-73), he is still acting within the acceptable parameters of 
mimetic desire. Further, as the scene develops, Macbeth’s acceptance of what the witches 
have told him rapidly replaces his apprehension, which is most observable after Ross and 
Angus bequeath him with Cawdor’s title and he states, “Two truths are told / As happy 
prologues to the swelling act / Of the imperial theme” (1.3.126-128). Macbeth’s language 
is not only a striking example of an anticipatory sentiment, but more importantly it 
seamlessly precedes the most ostensible language of Macbeth’s involvement in a mimetic 
rivalry with Duncan: 
…why do I yield to that suggestion 
Whose horrid image doth unfix my hair 
And make my seated heart knock at my ribs 
Against the use of nature? Present fears 
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Are less than horrible imaginings. 
My thought, whose murder yet is but fantastical, 
Shakes so my single state of man that function 
Is smothered in surmise, and nothing is 
But what is not. (1.3.133-141) 
That speech is Macbeth’s ultimate desire laid bare and encapsulates that very essence of 
mimesis within the play. It is from that speech that all subsequent instances of sacrifice 
may draw their origin, and it is that speech which truly manifests as the most basic posit of 
Girard’s entire theory of sacrificial violence: “Violent opposition…is the signifier of 
ultimate desire” (Girard 148). 
 If Macbeth is the key archetype of violence and sacrifice in Macbeth, then the 
witches, who serve in part as the agents of his desire, are no less pivotal figures in regard 
to sacrifice of the play. Indeed, as characters, the witches no less actively participate in 
sacrifice. Their participation may be seen most clearly during the infamous cauldron 
passages of the play in Act 4, Scene 1, for while the cauldron episode is textually an 
example of dark magic, it is inherently also an example of a highly sacrificial ritual. As 
Girard notes on the nature of sacrifice, “There is in fact no object or endeavor in whose 
name a sacrifice cannot be made, especially when the social basis of the act has begun to 
blur” (8). Given that the witches describe their cauldron ritual to Macbeth as “A deed 
without a name” (Macbeth 4.1.65), it is most certainly well beyond any definable social 
basis. Additionally, as the meeting between Macbeth, Banquo, and the witches in Act 1 
shows, the witches are part of the supernatural in the play; they are above nature and are 
abnormal, social outcasts who are attended by demons and must convene in secret in order 
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to do harm to others. The social basis with which Girard is concerned is most definitely 
blurred by these facts, and as a result may the witches carry out a sacrificial ritual through 
the Girardian model even though such an act is veiled by an entertaining dance and magic 
show. 
Similarly, how the witches carry out their involvement with sacrificial rite and ritual 
in the play is of no less importance. Focusing once more on the cauldron passages of Act 
4, Scene 1, the elements of sacrifice are quite literally present in the fascinating ingredients 
that the witches’ add to their infamous brew. Those ingredients include such gnarly fetishes 
as “Eye of newt and toe of frog, / Wool of bat and tongue of dog, / …Liver of blaspheming 
Jew, / …Nose of Turk, and Tartar’s lips” (4.1.14-29) among other less than pleasant 
oddities. By taking all these things and combining them into the cauldron for a foul 
purpose, the witches emulate a sacrificial ritual. Further, while there at first may seem to 
be a fashion of dichotomy between these ingredients insomuch as the animal parts seem 
somehow less appropriate as sacrificial objects than the human parts, especially given that 
Girard concerns himself far more with sacrifice and violence among human beings, it must 
be noted that there is truly no separating what constitutes a “non-sacrificial” ingredient 
from a “sacrificial” ingredient or what constitutes a “non-proper” sacrificial ingredient 
from a “proper” sacrificial ingredient. As Girard clarifies about sacrificial objects, “There 
is no essential difference between animal sacrifice and human sacrifice” (Girard 10), and 
thus the parts the witches choose to throw into the cauldron, be such parts of animal origin 
or human origin, are equivalent under the lens of the Girardian concept of sacrifice, as well 
as being reminiscent of traditional religious sacrifice, in which animals are chosen in place 
of humans for a sacrificial ritual. 
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 Returning now to the mimesis of Macbeth, the mimetic relationship that begins 
between Cawdor and Duncan and then evolves so to be between Macbeth and Duncan is 
perhaps the most significant mimetic progression of the entire play. Both sets of rivalries 
are begotten by intense desire and fueled by violence, and the rivalries, if conjoined as to 
be seen as one mimetic interplay, serve as a fantastic illustration of Girard’s entire theory. 
According to Girard, when the “model” of a mimetic rivalry learns of his position, he is 
not only “surprised to find himself engaged in competition” (146), but he “concludes that 
the disciple has betrayed his confidence by following in his footsteps” (146). Such 
perfidious interaction is first noted between Cawdor and Duncan, who as the servant/master 
dynamic already shows, are set as rivals due to Cawdor’s ill attempt at rebellion. Duncan 
displays the appropriate sense of betrayal and surprise at Cawdor’s treachery in two 
different passages. In Act 1, Scene 2, he declares how “No more that Thane of Cawdor 
shall deceive / Our bosom interest,” facilitating betrayal; and in Act 1, Scene 4, he admits 
that “There’s no art / To find the mind’s construction in the face. / [Cawdor] was a 
gentleman on whom I built / An absolute trust” (1.4.12-14), facilitating surprise. 
The same semblance of perfidious interaction may be noted between Macbeth and 
Duncan, although the irony is that Macbeth, as the superior rival to Duncan, does not allow 
Duncan to take note of his violent intentions. Indeed, Duncan hails Macbeth with the same 
language of praise in Act 1, Scene 4 as he does Cawdor earlier, naming Macbeth “worthiest 
cousin” (1.4.14), “worthy Cawdor” (1.4.47), and “peerless kinsman” (1.4.58). Further, 
Duncan not only declares in Act 1, Scene 4 that “[Macbeth] is full so valiant. / And in his 
commendations I am fed” (1.4.44-45), but in Act 1, Scene 6 Duncan states, “We love him 
highly, / And shall continue our graces towards him” (1.5.29-30). In construing Macbeth’s 
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response to the entirety of Duncan’s praise, but one passage is required. That passage, the 
second most ostensible language of Macbeth’s mimetic desire and violent intention, falls 
directly after Duncan names Malcolm the Prince of Cumberland—his chosen successor—
in Act 1, Scene 4. Macbeth states, “The Prince of Cumberland—that is a step / On which I 
must fall down or else o’erleap, / For in my way it lies. Stars, hide your fire, / Let not light 
see my black and deep desires” (1.4.48-51). 
As Macbeth’s intent is clear, his subsequent murder of Duncan brings the mimetic 
rivalry between them to a head and serves as a pivotal example of sacrifice within the 
tragedy. As Girard points out, in any sacrifice “the victim is sacred, [and] it is criminal to 
kill him—but the victim is sacred only because he is to be killed” (Girard 1). Such 
sentiment is triply applicable to the case of Macbeth and Duncan, for if it is a crime to 
murder any faceless figure merely named “victim,” then if it is a crime to murder one who 
has become a houseguest, and it is surely a crime to murder one’s own king—a figure, no 
less, with whom one is supposed to share the dynamic of the servant/master bond. Yet 
contrary to what the word “murder” may seem to imply, there is but a superficial difference 
between words such as “murder,” and “victim,” and “sacrifice” in Girard’s model. As 
Girard argues, “sacrifice and murder would not lend themselves to this game of reciprocal 
substitution if they were not in some way related” (1). It is important to realize that sacrifice 
and murder are not identical to Girard, but they are related to such a degree that even though 
Macbeth’s thoughts are drawn to “murder” in his Act 1, Scene 3 speech, his language may 
as well read “sacrifice,” and even though Duncan is king, he may as well just as easily be 
another faceless “victim.” Thus, Duncan’s murder, which is to say Duncan’s sacrifice, is 
far more apropos to the resolution of a mimetic rivalry than simply being an act of regicide. 
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In sacrificing Duncan, Macbeth ensures that the throne of Scotland will be his; the “black 
and deep desires” and “murder yet fantastical” which plague his mind serve their mimetic 
purpose. 
Yet in spite of that, there remains a peculiar aftereffect to Macbeth’s succession to 
the Scottish throne that need be examined. In Girard’s model, one of the primary reasons 
mimesis is so effective is that a successful sacrifice takes place. Girard argues that when 
“polarized by the sacrificial killing, violence is appeased. It subsides” (265). If that were 
indeed true, then Macbeth’s reign of terror should not take place. Clearly, something is 
amiss. The issue, however, does not reside with Girard’s model so much as it does with the 
character of Macbeth himself. To elaborate, after succeeding the throne, Macbeth is no 
longer able to partake in public sacrificial rite by means of slaying Duncan’s enemies, and 
thus he begins to shy away from the expected public sacrificial violence of a mimetic 
conflict and causes a litany of private deaths in his growing paranoia and madness. Such 
deaths, though they may not immediately seem a part of the same reciprocal substitution 
that allows “victim,” and “sacrifice,” and “murder” to be interchangeable, are in fact part 
of the same strain. That is because Girard maintains “the difference between sacrificial and 
nonsacrificial violence is anything but exact; it is even arbitrary” (40). Further, there 
remains “a fundamental truth about violence; if left unappeased, violence will accumulate 
until it overflows its confines and floods the surrounding area” (10). Given such 
knowledge, it is little wonder why Macbeth’s reign is marked by a stint of unexpected 
violence rather than appeasement as Girard’s model states it should otherwise present. The 
public violence which so well maintains the security of Scotland during Duncan’s rule is 
forcibly replaced by Macbeth’s own secretive private violence, which itself begins with the 
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act of secretive violence causing Duncan’s death. When no longer public, proper sacrificial 
violence cannot control outbreaks of maleficent violence such as those constituting 
Macbeth’s bloody time as king. Even so, not all the violence and death that takes place 
during Macbeth’s time as king is arbitrary; there yet remain two distinct mimetic rivalries 
which Macbeth participates in order to, as his paranoia demands he believe, retain the 
throne. 
The first of such rivalries is between Macbeth and Banquo. The conflict between 
these two characters is interesting insomuch as Macbeth, who now takes up the mantle of 
mimetic “model” rather than mimetic “disciple” because he is king, sees in Banquo the 
qualities of a disciple. Those qualities present themselves in Banquo through the same 
notions of surprise and betrayal as earlier encountered when Duncan speaks of Cawdor. In 
Act 3, Scene 1, they are made manifest when Macbeth admits not only how “Our fears in 
Banquo / Stick deep, and in his royalty of nature / Reigns that which would be feared” 
(Macbeth 3.1.50-52), but also how “There is none but he / Whose being I do fear, and under 
him / My genius is rebuked as, it is said, / Mark Antony’s was by Caesar” (3.1.55-58). To 
elevate any character to the point that character is indistinguishable from one of the Caesars 
is a very dangerous action in any of Shakespeare’s works, especially given the ambition 
and pragmatism expressed by Augustus in Antony and Cleopatra, who Macbeth is 
referencing, or the ultimate fate of Julius Caesar in Julius Caesar. Yet all whimsicalness 
aside, the comparison between Banquo and Augustus must nevertheless be well met. It 
Macbeth’s paranoid mind, mimetic violence must be brought against Banquo so that 
Macbeth may retain his kingship and his mind “be safely thus” (3.1.50). Correspondingly, 
it is interesting to note that Banquo’s own wishes never materialize in the play. While he 
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does soliloquize in Act 3, Scene 1, he never reveals his personal thoughts; thus, it is 
impossible to truly surmise whether Banquo possesses any desire or plan to overthrow and 
sacrifice Macbeth in the same way Macbeth overthrows and sacrifices Duncan. Ultimately, 
it matters not; as Girard shows, all intended sacrificial violence, whether being utilized in 
a truly sacrificial manner or not, remains arbitrary. 
The second rivalry into which Macbeth throws himself is with the Macduff family. 
That mimetic rivalry is no less interesting than the former, but rather than its importance 
being drawn from an inverse of the “model” and “disciple” roles, its importance stems from 
how it employs the use of Girard’s notion of the surrogate victim. It is important to observe 
that the true rivalry between Macbeth and the Macduff family is between Macbeth and 
Macduff himself; however, because Macduff has fled Scotland with Malcolm, Lady 
Macduff and Macduff’s children become the target of Macbeth’s violence. What is further 
interesting about the rivalry between Macbeth and Macduff is that its origin in the play is 
strikingly different than any rivalry thus far explicated. Rather than the rivalry originating 
through means of direct interaction between the two characters involved, Macbeth 
conceives the idea of rivalry with Macduff through the witches. Prior to Macbeth’s second 
meeting with the hags in Act 4, Scene 1, there is no textual evidence that supports the 
argument he will bring violence against Macduff; however, after the witches’ spirits tell 
Macbeth to “beware Macduff, / Beware the Thane of Fife” (4.1.87-88), Macbeth resolves 
himself to the mimetic rivalry and decides he must “make assurance double sure, / And 
take a bond of fate [Macduff] shalt not live” (4.1.99-100). 
One may argue that the rivalry between Macbeth and Macduff comes to an 
appropriately bloody Girardian end during their duel in Act 5, Scene 10, and one would 
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not be wrong for arguing thus. Yet the time between Act 4, Scene 1 and Act 5, Scene 10 
is, at least textually speaking, most significant, and comprises the most notable event in the 
rivalry between Macbeth and Macduff. That being the slaughter of Macduff’s family in 
Act 4, Scene 2. As Girard observes, “when unappeased, violence seeks and always finds a 
surrogate victim. The creature that excited its fury is abruptly replaced by another, chosen 
only because it is vulnerable and close at hand” (Girard 2). Accordingly, the creature to 
first excite fury is Macduff himself, because it is he with whom Macbeth has a rivalry, and 
thus it is Lady Macduff who correspondingly becomes the surrogate victim toward whom 
Macbeth’s violence shifts. Girard further observes that, in regard to the relationship 
between victim and surrogate victim, “it is essential that the victim be drawn from outside 
the community. The surrogate victim, by contrast, is a member of the community” (265). 
There is both a literal manner of interpretation regarding such a notion, and there is also a 
more culturally-based manner of interpretation more in tune with Girard’s thinking; 
ironically, either viewpoint is sufficient in order to reach the same conclusion regarding 
the status of Macduff and Lady Macduff as respective victim and surrogate victim. In 
regard to the former, because Macduff has fled Scotland to be with one of Duncan’s 
children, both of whom Macbeth has people believing are “In England and in Ireland, not 
confessing / Their cruel patricide” (Macbeth 3.1.32-33), Macduff effectively ostracizes 
himself from the Scottish community. Respectively, in regard to the latter, Girard states, 
“if the sacrificial victim belonged to the community (as does the surrogate victim), then his 
death would promote further violence instead of dispelling it. Far from reiterating the 
effects of generative violence, the sacrifice would inaugurate a new crisis” (Girard 269). 
Since Macbeth’s reign of terror does not end with the slaughter of Lady Macduff, who is 
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chosen specifically because she is conveniently vulnerable and close at hand, then Macbeth 
cannot find an appropriate enough victim through her in order to polarize her from Macduff 
and appease his violent mimetic inclinations. 
 The final significant case of mimesis in Macbeth may be extrapolated as a mimetic 
rivalry between Lady Macbeth and Macbeth himself. The mimetic conflict which they 
endure begins in Act 1, Scene 5 as Lady Macbeth reads aloud Macbeth’s letter detailing 
his experience with the witches. In her lamentations over what she believes to be 
suggestions of Macbeth’s overly compassionate nature, “too full o’th’ milk of human 
kindness” (Macbeth 1.5.15), she not only bids the “spirits / That tend on mortal thoughts, 
unsex [her] here” (1.5.38-40) but to also “Come to [her] woman’s breasts, / And take [her] 
milk for gall” (1.5.45-46). Such an appeal to a supernatural force requesting a metamorphic 
outcome is, to Girard, a direct implication of one’s own inner violent tendencies. As Girard 
observes, the “transformation of the real into the unreal is part of the process by which man 
conceals from himself the human origin of his own violence, by attributing it to the gods” 
(Girard 161). Although Lady Macbeth calls upon “spirits” rather than any deities, the 
concept is intrinsically identical. Lady Macbeth is shifting her own innate violent desire 
onto the supernatural so that she will not later regret being “[filled] from the crown to the 
toe top-full / Of direst cruelty” (Macbeth 1.5.40-41) or let any “compunctious visiting of 
nature shake [her] fell purpose” (1.5.43-44). Further, whether or not the actual spirits 
present in the play hear and obey her request is inconsequential; as already observed by 
Girard, there is “no object or endeavor in whose name a sacrifice cannot be made,” and 
thus Lady Macbeth’s masked violence is a viable gateway into her mimetic conflict with 
Macbeth. 
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Yet like all mimetic conflicts, so too must Lady Macbeth’s conflict with her 
husband reach a resolution. Given Lady Macbeth’s ultimate fate, it stands to reason that 
her suicide appropriately ends the conflict. Additionally, within the Girardian model of 
sacrifice, her death is far more aligned with a ritual act of sacrifice than a mere suicide. 
Girard offers no insight into suicide or self-harm, and thus it must argued that either form 
of violence is no different than the violence imposed against another. The most informative 
testimony about Lady Macbeth’s demise falls directly in the center of Malcolm’s final 
speech in Act 5, Scene 11. Malcolm’s language is specifically clear, when of her death he 
reports, “[Lady Macbeth], as ‘tis thought, by self and violent hands / Took off her life” 
(5.11.36-37). Quickly stated and even more quickly forgotten, Malcolm’s verse does little 
in the way of alluding to further detail about her suicide, which is most sensible since there 
exists no textual evidence directly relating the event or the reason for it in Macbeth. 
Regardless, what Malcolm’s statement does offer is verification of a Girardian mode of 
sacrifice at work. That Lady Macbeth’s hands are described as being “violent” during the 
action of her suicide is particularly important, because such a description is perfectly 
reminiscent of the innate personal violence that she seeks to shift in Act 1, the violence 
Girard describes. Further, Lady Macbeth’s decision to harm herself may be viewed as a 
natural redirection of her inability to harm Duncan in Act 2, since he “resembled / [Her] 
father as he slept” (2.2.12-13). As already noted by Girard, “when unappeased, violence 
seeks and always finds a surrogate victim;” and if left too long in finding that victim 
“violence will accumulate until it overflows.” 
Lady Macbeth’s paranoia and awkward behavior in Act 5 may be seen similarly as 
stemming from the mimetic rivalry with Macbeth that begins in Act 1. When the 
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Gentlewoman speaks to the Doctor of Physic about Lady Macbeth’s behavior and states, 
“It is an accustomed action with her, to seem thus / washing her hands. I have known her 
to continue in this a quarter / of an hour” (5.1.24-26), the Gentlewoman is highlighting the 
consequences imposed by Lady Macbeth’s appeal to the spirits to shift her violence 
appropriately. Additionally, Lady Macbeth’s paranoid behavior may be seen as evocative 
of any repressed guilt and remorse she feels as an accomplice to Duncan’s death, even 
though she herself is unable to kill him. Indeed, Lady Macbeth’s own subconscious wills 
itself against her, as she quite often attempts in vain to rid herself of both the “damned 
spot” (5.1.30) and “smell of the blood” (5.1.42) still metaphorically on her hands. Due to 
her outlet of violence being continually put off, then, the madness which consumes her 
leaves her with but one ultimate recourse. In order to rid herself of madness and polarize 
the violence of the mimetic rivalry, Lady Macbeth must commit suicide—must sacrifice 
herself—as Malcolm informs. Thus, the character of Lady Macbeth is representative of the 
lesser half of the mimetic rivalry between herself and Macbeth; the half ill-equipped to 
endure the violent behavior necessary in order to achieve victory. While Macbeth grows 
from a man who is “too full o’th’ milk of human kindness” into a man who slaughters 
indiscriminately, Lady Macbeth is never capable of growing in kind, leading to her death 
at her own hands. 
 Beyond Lady Macbeth’s excursion into self-sacrifice, it is lastly worth noting that 
she falls just short of practicing sacrifice in the play in a far more explicit sense. That may 
be seen just prior to the murder of King Duncan during Lady Macbeth and Macbeth’s 
marital quarrel. As Lady Macbeth accuses Macbeth of losing his will to kill the sleeping 
king, she states, “I have given suck, and know / How tender ‘tis to love the babe that milks 
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me. / I would, while it was smiling in my face, / Have plucked my nipple from his boneless 
gums / And dashed the brains out, had I so sworn / As you have done to this” (1.7.54-59).  
Such chastising is a flawless example of the conviction Lady Macbeth seeks to gain in her 
appeal to the spirits earlier in Act 1 so that she might commit Duncan’s murder in case her 
“kind” Macbeth cannot. However, in the Girardian model, Lady Macbeth’s language 
invokes the notion of a surrogate victim, a child who would bear the reception of her 
violence in Duncan’s place if such a child in fact existed. 
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CHAPTER III 
Macbeth, Scapegoat of Scotland: Religious Turmoil and Crisis of Degree 
 
The type of religious bondage unconsciously suggested by the work of Hager and 
Anderson is nothing unusual or unexpected to Girard. The controlling force, the problems 
of interpretation, and the consequences that arise when the two grow out of balance and 
can no longer coexist harmoniously are all natural phenomena that inform the tenuous 
relationship between religion and violence in any culture be it real or fictional. As Girard 
states on the matter in Violence and the Sacred, “Religion instructs men as to what they 
must and must not do to prevent a recurrence of destructive violence” (Girard 259). It might 
be thought easily affirmed, then, that the death of Caesar appeases Hager’s bloodthirsty 
gods, and that the death of Cordelia is enough for Anderson’s masses of Englishmen to 
come to terms with their interpretive dilemmas. For if such things were truly the answers 
to the problems, then the gods would remain appeased and the masses would cease to 
question. Yet such things do not occur; the gods grow unsated once more in the chaotic 
aftermath of Caesar’s demise, and the people of England, as Anderson notes, continuously 
grow to experience more and more “uncertainty surrounding acts of sacrificial violence in 
Reformation England” (Anderson 260). As such, it is not enough for one to focus solely
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on the successful manner by which religion may curb recurring violence in Girard’s model, 
one must also see fit to focus on what might happen when the supernatural or religious 
body that influences the model fails to uphold its mandate to control violence. 
 In Macbeth, the position of supernatural force is conventionally thought to be 
occupied by the androgynous witches. While that is certainly not incorrect insomuch as it 
accounts for the lack of normative behavior embodied by the witches, it also fails to account 
for the greater supernatural force that commands them in the play. The figure who occupies 
the position of the supernatural to the greatest extent in Macbeth is instead the Greek 
goddess Hecate, who as a primordial deity associated with witchcraft is fully fit to oversee 
the witches’ ill machinations. Further, as a true deified figure, Hecate is well suited for 
examination under the lens of the Girardian model, both in regard to her status as what 
Girard might refer to as a mythical double, and also in regard to how she is partially 
incapable of controlling the witches, who should otherwise act at all times subservient to 
her in order to prevent recurrences of destructive violence, which religion according to 
Girard’s model is meant to accomplish. 
In regard to the idea of a mythical double, Girard notes that “there is no ancient 
divinity who does not have a double face” (Girard 251). That may of course be taken in the 
most literal context, as Girard does acknowledge on occasion the more bestial qualities of 
certain mythical figures; however, it is far more fortuitous to understand Girard’s idea in 
respect to what might be best considered its more religious attribute. That is to say, the 
attribute which specifically corresponds to any of the numerous “things” that any particular 
mythic deity is thought to oversee and is thus fit for worship. Examples of that phenomenon 
include the Roman god Janus, who is god of past and future—among other things—and 
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who is depicted literally as two-faced; similarly, the Roman goddess Trivia, who stands as 
Hecate’s Roman equivalent, is known as a triple-goddess rather than even merely a double. 
In regard to Macbeth’s incarnation of Hecate, even the most cursory glance at the text of 
the play is enough to ascertain that Hecate retains her place as the goddess of witchcraft, 
yet it is worth noting that Macbeth is not the only Shakespeare play in which Hecate 
appears. In A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Hecate is not only referenced by Puck as a 
goddess of the night (5.2.14), but she is concurrently referenced by Hippolyta as a goddess 
of the moon in Act 1; in King Lear, Hecate is referenced by Lear himself as being a 
mysterious deity of the night (1.1.110); in Hamlet, the player in the role of Lucianus in 
Hamlet’s play-within-a-play invokes Hecate as the goddess of witchcraft (3.2.236); and 
lastly, in Henry VI Part 1, Lord Talbot criticizes Joan la Pucelle as a “railing Hecate” 
(3.5.24), essentially implying that Pucelle is raving or chanting as one who is involved with 
witchcraft. These instances of Hecate’s appearance on stage, if not but through the words 
of numerous characters, adequately serve as confirmation enough that she should be 
regarded in Shakespeare’s works on a whole in the role of a mythical double as Girard’s 
theory implies. 
Doubling in Girard’s mythical manner does carry with it a second connotation that 
is no less important than the first. This second aspect of a mythical double concerns itself 
with what might be best understood as how the personalities of deities themselves tend to 
shift between two varying extremes. Such a notion is certainly not without great precedent 
in the mythological world, and even Girard’s own brief catalogue of mythic deities 
reinforces the notion most succinctly and clearly: “Dionysus is at one and the same time 
the ‘most terrible’ and the ‘most gentle’ of the gods. There is a Zeus who hurls thunderbolts 
28 
and a Zeus ‘as sweet as honey’” (Girard 251). Further examples include the Roman goddess 
Minerva, renowned as being a goddess of esteemed wisdom and justice while 
simultaneously exhibiting ferocity on the field of war; or the Greek god Poseidon, whose 
tenderness as the creator of the horse is counterbalanced by the terrible rage he exhibits as 
the creator of raging storms at sea. In each of these four examples, one must note the sheer 
extremes to which any mythic figure may turn, and further that in any of the four cases, 
one extreme is rooted in kindness, justice, or fidelity while the other extreme is rooted in 
violence, warfare, or anger. As Girard states, “religious thought perceives all those who 
participate in this violent interplay, whether actively or passively, as doubles” (251); which 
is to otherwise imply that any mythical figure will not only be multifaceted, but that one 
aspect of such complexity will be represented by chaos or violence. 
In Macbeth, Hecate is truly no different in regard to her double-ness than any other 
mythic deity herein discussed. Already may it be stated with conviction that the Hecate of 
Shakespeare’s works is doubled according to Girard’s primary criterion, being both 
goddess of witchcraft and the moon, but so too is she doubled according to the secondary 
criterion, although it is perhaps not at all as overtly apparent. It must be suggested, then, 
that there is more to Hecate than one may first suspect. Rather than merely being content 
to view the goddess as solely a source of evil in the play, a character who is only concerned 
with continuing to cause violence and chaos to define Macbeth’s life, one must instead also 
lend attention to the Hecate who is equally concerned with, just as Girard is concerned 
with, a sense of hierarchal order and one’s proper adherence to it. In order to accomplish 
such a feat, the two scenes in which Hecate appears must be examined chronologically as 
to show how Hecate both fails to uphold her mandate as the play’s premier supernatural 
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force, and also how she endeavors to correct that error so as to properly regulate religion 
as Girard deems religion must be regulated.  
It is, however, important to note that simply because Hecate is meant to act as the 
religious controlling force behind the witches’ machinations, her guidance does not 
necessarily imply a sense of goodness or peace. As Anderson notes, what a religious body 
preaches and what a religious body practices are not necessarily so mutually inclusive. 
Further, this argument is not meant to at all imply that those who inhabit Shakespeare’s 
fictional Scotland are represented as worshipping pagan deities; quite clearly the Judeo-
Christian God is on the minds and lips of characters such as Duncan and the Doctor, and 
even earnestly on the mind and lips of Macbeth himself for a time. Yet as Girard argues, 
peoples who maintain religious practices in any primitive society, of which Shakespeare’s 
England should be considered a part given its dogmatic belief in but a single “correct” 
approach to religion, will find themselves “incapable or grasping the essence of religion 
and attributing to it a real function” (259). That function being foremost the ability to 
control violence. So it does not matter whether the religion or religious figure being 
depicted on stage is of the Judeo-Christian persuasion or a primordial pagan deity such as 
Hecate; the end result, the Girardian model for religious control, is the same. 
That being so, Hecate’s first appearance in Macbeth in Act 3, Scene 5 is a most 
curious amalgamation of pagan magic and Girardian religious control that successfully 
bring the religious turmoil present in Macbeth to a head. Such turmoil is introduced by the 
First Witch, who in an effort to announce Hecate’s arrival as well as bring attention to the 
problem at hand asks the exasperated goddess, “Why, how now, Hecate? You look 
angerly” (Macbeth 3.5.1). Hecate’s reply is most illuminating: 
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Have I not reason, beldams as you are? 
Saucy and over-bold, how did you dare 
To trade and traffic with Macbeth 
In riddles and affairs of death, 
And I, the mistress of your charms, 
The close contriver of all harms, 
Was never called to bear my part 
Or show the glory of our art? (3.5.2-9) 
What Hecate references in her anger during that opening speech is twofold. Foremost, she 
acknowledges the complete collapse of the system of religious control for which she is 
meant to be responsible. By speaking to Macbeth of their own accord, the witches have 
gone beyond their station and dallied with the rites of control that belong to religion alone. 
Secondly, Hecate recognizes that due to the witches’ transgression, the chaotic fallout that 
follows the adequate collapse of the system has already begun. Anderson so gracefully 
translates these twofold issues into more technical Girardian terms by observing that in 
“Girard’s study of myth and primitive religion, the crisis occurs when the rites of surrogate 
violence no longer unite, but divide, removing the dam of controlled and controlling 
violence which protects the community from a return to chaotic, undifferentiated 
retribution” (Anderson 263). Since the witches have ignored the supreme rite belonging to 
religion—the rite to cast and control violence onto the people—the ultimate consequence 
of their misbehavior is the unadulterated spread of destructive violence throughout 
Scotland. Macbeth, the target of the witches’ whims, thus takes on a very peculiar role in 
Girard’s model of religious control. Not only is Macbeth a Girardian scapegoat, but he is a 
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scapegoat working against the grain; his spread of destructive violence is precisely what 
religion as Girard argues it is meant to deter. Hecate additionally concedes Macbeth’s 
twisted purpose in the play during her opening speech when she perceives how everything 
“[the witches] have done / Hath been but for a wayward son, / Spiteful and wrathful, who, 
as others do, / Loves for his own ends, not for [them]” (Macbeth 3.5.10-13). The point is 
clear: Macbeth does not incite acts of violence on behalf of the witches, nor does he incite 
violence on behalf of Hecate and thus for the sake of maintaining the purpose of religion; 
rather, Macbeth’s instigations of destructive violence serve only himself in order to appease 
his unending paranoia and bloodlust. 
 The great irony of Macbeth’s situation is that it did not necessarily have to occur as 
it did according to Girard’s model of religious control. On a metaphysical level, such an 
argument may be made without crossing the boundary into a baseless “what if” scenario, 
because there is in fact precedent for what true religious control looks like in Macbeth. 
That precedent begins during the ill-fated first meeting between Hecate and the witches. 
When Hecate commands her trio of androgynous hags to “make amends now. Get you 
gone, / And at the pit of Acheron / Meet me i’th’ morning” (3.5.14-16), she is reestablishing 
the framework of subservience to religion in the play. Further, when she subsequently 
commands the trio that “[their] vessels and [their] spells provide, / [their] charms and 
everything beside” (3.5.18-19) in anticipation of Macbeth’s eminent arrival, the framework 
is further solidified. When the following morning arrives in what accounts for Act 4, Scene 
1, the second and final scene in which Hecate plays a part, the witches act wholly 
subservient to Hecate’s whims, and the goddess herself continues to command by means 
of having direct involvement in the completion of the witches’ famous brew, the very same 
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“vessel” and “spell” she previously bid them create. Due to Hecate’s ability to control the 
witches and involve herself with the brew, she finally and correctly assumes the mantle of 
Macbeth’s premier supernatural force. She is also able, it is worth noting, to at last use her 
mythical arts in order to become the “close contriver of all harms” as she so previously 
desired so that she might further ensnare Macbeth, the poor scapegoat. Additionally, for 
the sake of clarity, the reinvigoration of religious control in the play may indeed be 
described in a more stratified manner. Narrowed particularly to Act 4, Scene 1, in which 
the control remains the most apparent, one may understand it more succinctly in terms of 
the witches’ brew. For each gnarly ingredient the witches desire to add to the brew, Hecate 
not only allows them to do so but determines what allowance of the ingredient is to be 
added. The following interplay details the control: 
FOURTH WITCH. Here’s the blood of a bat. 
HECATE. Put in that, O put in that! 
FIFTH WITCH. Here’s leopard’s bane. 
HECATE. Put in a grain. 
FOURTH WITCH. The juice of toad, the oil of adder. 
FIFTH WITCH. Those will make the younker madder. 
HECATE. Put in, there’s all, and rid the stench. (4.1.51-57) 
In that exchange, there is neither debate nor derision; Hecate commands while the witches 
follow her insidious instructions. The crisis which Anderson states will occur when the rite 
of violence is ignored, or more precisely the crisis Girard suggests will take place when 
religion fails to prevent recurrences of destructive violence, is ended in Macbeth by Act 4, 
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Scene 1. Yet simply because the religious turmoil of the play has been weathered does not 
at all imply that further damage will not ultimately be done before Macbeth is killed. 
 Indeed, in spite of Hecate’s ability to reconstitute her religious control in Macbeth, 
and in doing so perhaps in part curb a greater crisis from occurring, there remains a “crisis” 
of a wholly different sort that pervades the play. That second crisis is informed by what is 
formally known as Girard’s theory of undifferentiation, more commonly referred to as the 
sacrificial crisis or even more colloquially as the crisis of degree. In Girard’s own 
terminology, the crisis of degree “can be defined…as a crisis of distinctions—that is, a 
crisis affecting the cultural order” (Girard 49); and even more simply put, the crisis of 
degree may be understood as the dissolution of defined hierarchal roles leading society into 
a state of absolute chaos. In Macbeth, the social order that is so uniform in the model of a 
standard kingship, whether that model is based on heredity as it is in England or rather 
based on electivity as in Scotland, is forcibly ended by the death of Duncan at Macbeth’s 
hands in Act 1. It is tempting to view the dissolution of culture as being present earlier in 
the play, specifically when Macbeth and Banquo meet the witches, because the erosion of 
gender categories so well personified by the witches does lend itself to the notion of cultural 
disorder. To recognize that is not wrong; as Girard further details, a cultural order is “a 
regulated system of distinctions in which the differences among individuals are used to 
establish their ‘identity’ and their mutual relationships” (49). Being unable to even identify 
the gender of the witches with certainty as Macbeth and Banquo are most definitely calls 
into question the “identity” of the hags, and it further seems to corrode any regulation 
Scotland’s social system. Regardless, the issue of gender in Macbeth is in itself a gateway 
to a completely different set of problems, and one is better served following the play’s 
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crisis of degree down an entirely different strain of thought. That being, it is far more 
prudent to understand the crisis of degree as it pertains to Macbeth himself and his role as 
the scapegoat of Scotland, into which he is so unwittingly thrown. In order to accomplish 
that endeavor, the manner by which religious control may be separated from the crisis of 
degree in Girard’s model must be made manifest. 
As Girard asserts, “sacrifice too can be defined solely in terms of the sacred, 
without reference to any particular divinity; that is, it can be defined in terms of maleficent 
violence polarized by the victim and metamorphosed by his death…into beneficent 
violence” (258). Essentially, Girard’s assertion implies that even if a culture were without 
a particular overseeing religious body or mythic figure, the institution of sacrifice as a 
means of maintaining and regulating social order would remain much the same as it would 
under religious control as long as a sufficient victim could take up the mantle of the 
religious body or mythic figure. The caveat, of course, is that any such culture containing 
such a victim would not only be far more unstable, but the dissolution of its regulated 
system of identity leading to the crisis of degree would entail far more extreme 
consequences. Such a fate would befall the culture because “anything that adversely affects 
the institution of sacrifice will ultimately pose a threat to the very basis of the community, 
to the principles on which its social harmony and equilibrium depend” (49). Within the 
confines of Macbeth, when the importance of Hecate and her status as the play’s premier 
supernatural force are ignored, then it becomes the titular character’s own rise to power 
that constitutes the very process by which the institution of sacrifice, and thus also the 
regulated system of Scotland’s identity and basis of its community, become threatened. 
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Macbeth himself becomes the victim required of Girard’s model; and in Girard’s model, 
the victim is always sacred. 
Additionally, Macbeth is a particularly fascinating work to apply the notion of a 
sacred victim to precisely due to the presence of a king in its fictional community. Taking 
into account the idea of divine kingship that was so pervasively critical in Shakespeare’s 
era for but a moment, it is further worth noting that even if a particular divinity such as 
Hecate were absent, there would remain a type of divinity left in control. That divinity is 
of course he who holds the title of king, for as Girard observes, “royalty is an incarnation 
of the sacred” (258). Some may doubt the veracity of Macbeth’s kingship given that it is 
earned by regicide, but such thinking is irrational. Scotland, as an elective monarchy, is not 
stymied by the same rules as an English hereditary monarchy. As long as there is a man 
who holds the title of king, then that man is indeed the king; and in Shakespeare’s works, 
no play concerned with kingship ends without a king. Thus, Macbeth is inarguably King 
of Scotland, and as such he is sacred. Yet as Girard goes on to observe, “the sacred king is 
also a monster. He is simultaneously god, man, and savage beast” (252). These four 
descriptive qualities—god, man, savage beast, and most importantly, sacred—when held 
in conjunction, not only describe Macbeth the King in a most earnest fashion from his rise 
to power until his death, but they also offer a satisfactory measure of his status as the sacred 
victim, which is to say the scapegoat, of the play. As such, one can look solely upon 
Macbeth without regarding Hecate when examining the crisis of degree within the play. 
As the instigator of all maleficent and beneficent violence that fuels the play’s crisis 
of degree, Macbeth is in his own way as equally two-faced or doubled as any mythic or 
god-like figure. Certainly that may be rationalized through his qualities of godhood, 
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manhood, beastly savagery, and sacredness, but such qualities together are only Macbeth’s 
after his ascension to the throne. Prior to his tyrannical reign, there is a very different 
Macbeth present in the play with what may be described as a partially different set of 
qualities. That earlier Macbeth is, for convenience, a character who might be better called 
Macbeth the Warrior. The warrior persona of Macbeth is one who is certainly no stranger 
to savagery, and in his own way he is neither stranger to godhood or stranger to being one 
who carries out sacrificial rites, as well. It must be conceded, then, that while the two 
different Macbeths within the play do share a certain degree of similarity, Macbeth the 
Warrior and Macbeth the King are ultimately two very different characters according to 
Girard’s model. More importantly, the crisis of degree that throws Scotland into chaos is 
begun by the former and ends with the death of the latter. 
The former Macbeth, Macbeth the Warrior, is mentioned first toward the play’s 
onset, but his only true time on stage is during the two duels he fights at the end of the 
tragedy—one of which he loses at the cost of his own life. Prior to those duels, Macbeth 
the Warrior is only mentioned, and what may be immediately noticed about him is his 
absolutely savagery in battle. This savagery is described by the wounded captain in Act 1, 
Scene 2 who has seen Macbeth the Warrior draw arms and fight. As the captain states, 
Macbeth’s prowess on the field of battle is so great it manifests in the ability to cleave a 
man “from the nave to th’ chops” (Macbeth 1.2.22). Such strength, dexterity, and violent 
inclinations are certainly reminiscent of one who is beastly or acts savagely, and Girard 
would most certainly agree, as he states that “the urge to violence triggers certain physical 
changes that prepare men’s bodies for battle” (Girard 2). Such an “urge to violence” is in 
this particular case within Macbeth’s narrative a direct result of the rebellious Macdonald, 
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the poor fool who the captain recounts Macbeth nearly cutting in half. As one who actively 
rebels, Macdonald is upsetting the social harmony and equilibrium of Scotland, for as 
Girard states, “any change, however slight, in the hierarchical classification of living 
creatures risks undermining the whole sacrificial structure” (39). As such, Macdonald is 
causing the crisis of degree, and when Macbeth the Warrior kills him in order to return 
harmony and equilibrium to Scotland, Macbeth also effectively ends the crisis caused by 
Macdonald. Further, that Macbeth chooses to kill Macdonald by means of “bloody 
execution” (Macbeth 1.2.18) is significant because the act of taking a life is directly a part 
of Girard’s theory of violence. “Death is the ultimate violence that can be inflicted on a 
living being” (Girard 255) according to Girard, and that Macbeth is so proficient a killer 
cannot be ignored. As one who carries out the sacrificial rite of killing, Macbeth is savage 
bar none. 
Further, the notion of Macbeth the Warrior is solidified even more when it seeks to 
account for the particular type of godhood Macbeth experiences prior to becoming a king. 
That godhood is separable from what Macbeth earns after his ascension to the throne, 
because it is wholly reliant on Macbeth being on the field of battle. According to Girard, 
there is an inescapable element of etiquette belonging to violence that expresses the idea 
that “it is [a] god who supposedly demands the victims; he alone, in principle, who savors 
the smoke from the altars and requisitions the slaughtered flesh. It is to appease his anger 
that the killing goes on, that the victims multiply” (7). It is tempting, in light of such 
knowledge, to view King Duncan as the god for whom Macbeth slaughters; however, if for 
but a moment Macbeth is viewed through the lens of that idea, then his warrior status may 
further take on the mantle of a war-god too overcharged with his own abilities to ultimately 
38 
do good for the social harmony and equilibrium of the community. While the ability to 
nearly cleave a grown man in two certainly aides that notion, it is additionally solidified by 
the way Macbeth is described as being “Bellona’s bridegroom” (Macbeth 1.2.53) in the 
court of King Duncan; and how fitting it is, after all, that a goddess of war should have a 
god of war as a husband. Yet in greater respect to the notion of violence, the way Duncan 
sends Macbeth to fight the enemies of the crown prior to his murder is very much akin to 
Duncan ensuring that wave after wave of human sacrifices will be sent to Macbeth the 
Warrior-God for the slaughter. In that way is the need for violence as Girard explains it 
appeased, and so too do such sacrifices appease Macbeth until he becomes king himself 
and is no longer able to personally benefit from such slaughter. 
To briefly address at this junction a particular caveat that may rest in the minds of 
some, it may be seen fit to argue that the slaughter of Macduff’s family is an act of savagery 
that Macbeth the King does indeed benefit from as though he were a warrior or a war-god. 
While perhaps that could arguably be true on a humanistic level, it is more important to 
point out that the slaughter itself is not as important as the person who does the 
slaughtering. Although Macbeth the King orders Lady Macduff and her children to be 
slaughtered, it is not by his own hand that the deaths take place. Such a distinction is 
critical, because Macbeth the Warrior or War-God always deals out death by his own hand; 
it is only Macbeth the King who orders others to deal out death for him, such as in the 
slaughter of the Macduffs or the assassination of Banquo. Similarly, one may argue that it 
is Macbeth the King who duels Young Siward and Macduff in the final Act and loses; 
however, such a notion is equally as incorrect. In Act 4, Scene 1, Macbeth is told by the 
spirits most clearly that “[he] shall never vanquished be until / Great Birnam Wood to High 
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Dunsinane Hill / Shall come against him” (4.1.108-110). During the final battle of the play, 
wood from Birnam does indeed come to Dunsinane, and thus Macbeth’s rule is at an end; 
Macbeth the King no longer exists. Instead, Macbeth reverts back to his warrior persona 
and is sacrificed so the social harmony and equilibrium of the community in Scotland may 
be restored. 
Turning lastly to that final battle which “saves” Scotland, it would be quite 
appropriate to judge it the greatest depiction of the crisis of degree found in Macbeth. Fewer 
things, if any, will upset the social harmony and equilibrium of a cultural than open 
rebellion. That has already been observed in the failed rebellion brought to Scotland in Act 
1 by Macdonald and Cawdor, and it is again observed in Act 5 when Malcolm, Macduff, 
and the “ten thousand men” (4.3.191) on loan from England bring it to Macbeth. Yet there 
is a problem. Beyond the chaos of rebellion fueling the crisis of degree, the violent intent 
of Macduff against Macbeth during the rebellion is not at all evocative of a proper 
Girardian sacrifice. To elaborate, while Girard does contend the difference between 
sacrificial and nonsacrificial violence is arbitrary, the motivation behind the actions that 
utilize such violence is not. Girard argues that “a properly conducted ritual killing is never 
openly linked to another bloodletting of irregular character. It never allows itself to pass as 
a deliberate act of retribution” (Girard 25). For Macduff, returning to Scotland to bring the 
tyranny of Macbeth to an end is secondary; his principle reason for fighting Macbeth is one 
of retribution. Such intent is directly alluded to in Act 4, Scene 3 after Ross has come to 
England to speak with Malcolm and relate the ill news that the Macduff family has been 
“savagely slaughtered” (Macbeth 4.3.206). In response to the news, Malcolm’s endeavor 
to comfort Macduff is said in the language of vengeance. Malcom states, “Be comforted. / 
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Let’s make us medicines of our great revenge / To cure this deadly grief” (4.3.214-216). 
Not being enough to rouse Macduff, Malcolm continues to counsel him with violent 
language by stating that Macduff’s anger must become “the whetstone of [his] sword. Let 
grief / Convert to anger: blunt not the heat, enrage it” (4.3.230-231). Finally, in response 
to Malcolm’s continued goading, Macduff concedes the “deliberate act of retribution” that 
will serve as his vengeance against Macbeth. He states, “Bring thou this fiend of Scotland 
and myself. / Within my sword’s length set him” (4.3.235-236). 
Girard observes that “if the counterviolence were inflicted on the aggressor himself, 
it would…become an act of pure vengeance, requiring yet another act of vengeance and 
transforming itself into the very thing it was designed to prevent” (Girard 26). The brief 
conversation between Macduff and Malcolm in regard to their fight against Macbeth is 
perfectly indicative of Girard’s observation. Further, that the “bloodletting of irregular 
character” Girard views as a requirement for revenge should come as no surprise as being 
the slaughter of Lady Macduff. As the surrogate victim, “vulnerable and close at hand” to 
Macbeth because Macduff himself it not, Lady Macduff is slaughtered merely as part of 
the mimetic rivalry between Macbeth and Macduff. As already observed, her death does 
not conclude the rivalry; only the death of Macbeth portends such resolution. With that in 
mind, it is helpful to realize that “only violence can put an end to violence, and that is why 
violence is self-propagating. Everyone wants to strike the last blow, and reprisal can thus 
follow reprisal without any true conclusion ever being reached” (26). Such is the case here; 
Macbeth slaughters Lady Macduff in an “irregular” act not befitting of mimetic conflict, 
the crisis of degree during his reign continues to evolve, and Macduff is resigned to an act 
of pure vengeance rather than sacrificial ritual. 
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That Scotland survives this sacrificial mess is almost astonishing, but its survival 
and the insinuation that it will go on to flourish under Malcolm’s reign, as well as due to 
the line of future kings already begotten by Banquo, are correspondingly Girardian in 
nature. In part, the connection to Girard is an association of historical convenience. 
Macduff notes In Act 4 how “[Macbeth] has no children” (Macbeth 4.3.217) who may 
continue the reciprocal acts of vengeance that both he and Macbeth have already begun. 
Such is history. Yet beyond mere convenience lay the notion that, “having sown the seeds 
of death, the god, ancestor, or mythic hero then dies himself or selects a victim to die in his 
stead” (Girard 255) so that “the entire community, threatened by the same fate, can be 
reborn in a new or renewed cultural order” (255). Macbeth the Warrior, the War-God, is 
dead. In his place there is no substitute made; he is himself the scapegoat that serves as 
surrogate victim for Scotland’s “new cultural order.” As Malcolm states at the very end of 
the tragedy, from the moment he is recognized as Scotland’s rightful king, his most trusted 
thanes will “Henceforth be earls, the first that ever Scotland / In such an honour named” 
(Macbeth 5.11.29-30), and the destructive violence of Macbeth’s tyrannical reign will 
forever be washed away. 
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CHAPTER IV 
“What bloody man is that?”: Causal Undifferentiation and Category Erosion 
 
 Throughout the course of Macbeth, interrogative expressions that include words 
such as “what” and “how” are observable well in excess of one-hundred times. So profusely 
inlaid within the text as they are, the use of such interrogatives denote a sort of endemic 
urge by the characters of the play to pose queries seeking out clarification or identification. 
In the Girardian model, the very same process of neurotically searching for and demanding 
difference amongst things which otherwise appear to be similar is a matter inextricably tied 
to undifferentiation. As previously introduced, undifferentiation is formally associated 
with the crisis of degree; however, it must be argued that while undifferentiation and crisis 
of degree act as part of the same overarching ideological concept, they nevertheless 
function as two independent aspects of that concept. To clarify, whereas undifferentiation 
serves as the “cause” which leads to violence, the crisis of degree serves as the “effect” of 
that violence. Undifferentiation is the failure to observe difference, is the blurring of 
distinct categories, and is the culturally fueled stigma against which people hope to distance 
themselves; crisis of degree is the action, is the outcome, is the violence itself and the length 
to which people will go either to perpetuate such violence or, if mimesis and sacrifice work 
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as they are designed, to appease such violence into something beneficent. Admittedly, 
Girard himself does not directly address the interplay between the two functions of his 
concept, yet the sheer number of interrogative issues observable in Macbeth leading to a 
severe erosion of categories is in itself a testimony to the notion of their individuality—or 
what might be otherwise expressed as their own unique differentiation. So if the crisis of 
degree may articulate the effects of the chaos that seizes Scotland during Macbeth’s 
tyrannical reign, then the undifferentiation that is so rampant throughout the play will 
herein serve well as a further pivotal point of discussion in understanding how Girard’s 
model may be applied to Macbeth. 
Appropriately enough, then, the presence of the undifferentiation that causes the 
complete erosion of categories in Macbeth begins precisely at the play’s onset, when in 
Act 1, Scene 1, as the androgynous witches come on stage in order to discuss their future 
meeting with Macbeth, the First Witch poses the query, “When shall we three meet again?” 
(Macbeth 1.1.1). Ostensibly, there is little investigative value to the question on its own 
beyond noting how, as the very first line of the play, it is already suggestive of the endemic 
urge for clarification or identification seen throughout Macbeth’s remaining acts. Yet when 
the Second Witch replies, “When the battle’s lost and won” (1.1.4), the floodgate of 
undifferentiation is suddenly loosed upon the play. Any battle may be described as “lost” 
or “won,” but to describe the same battle with terminology at once reflective of both belies 
any notion of differentiation between defeat and victory. The witches’ language in that 
scene exemplifies such a lack of differentiation. As language, it is very particular about 
how it strives to avoid any single description that may identify a thing conclusively one 
way or another. Due to that, the language of the witches effortlessly erodes distinguishable 
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categories, which is equally observable when, as one voice, the three witches proclaim, 
“Fair is foul, and foul is fair” (1.1.10). Once again, there is no direct distinction made 
present in the witches’ language in regard to their subject; “fair” is most certainly not 
“foul,” and “foul” is equally in no way “fair.” The categories which might contain specific 
meanings for either word individually are shattered when the words are made 
indistinguishable. Congruently, such lack of distinction is of no surprise to Girard, as he 
contends that “being made up of differences, language finds it almost impossible to express 
undifferentiation directly” (Girard 64). A notion well met, especially in regard to the 
language of the witches. While the direct expression of undifferentiation may prove 
difficult for a language to articulate, indirect comparisons made between nonsensical 
opposites or dissimilar pairs certainly achieve a sense of undifferentiation more than 
adequately. 
Yet some may choose to interpret the witches’ language in a completely different 
manner. To any such individuals, rather than possessing the undifferentiated language 
requisite for the crisis of degree, the witches are characters who possess language that is 
just theatrically driven and left purposefully impartial in its inability to create 
distinguishable ideas. On a superficial level, such an argument is in fact sound. Girard 
describes impartiality as language which “implies a deliberate refusal to take sides, a firm 
commitment to treat both contestants equally. The impartial party is not eager to resolve 
the issue, does not want to know if there is a resolution; nor does he maintain that resolution 
is impossible” (45-46). In regard to the witches, the notion of impartiality appears credible. 
Indeed, given that the witches do not decide whether the battle has been ultimately lost or 
won, and by extension cannot choose a loser or a victor, and equally given that they do not 
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decide between whether the day is foul or fair, it is quite tempting to believe that such 
impartiality exists in their language. Regardless, such impartiality is an illusion. The 
witches are most decidedly not impartial; they are the “secret, black, and midnight hags” 
(Macbeth 4.1.64) who deliberately set sailors “tempest-tossed” (1.3.24) and willingly 
contribute to a ritual so beyond normative social behavior that it is “A deed without a name” 
(4.1.65). With no name, the “deed” has no basis in a Girardian society; there is no other act 
against which it may be compared and differentiated, and thus it is dangerous, it is 
undifferentiated, and just as the witches, it is most certainly not impartial.  
Further, the illusion of impartiality in the Girardian model is indicative of the very 
genre of tragedy, which as a genre functions as the antecedent of undifferentiation and 
category erosion. As Girard argues, “Tragedy begins at [the] point where the illusion of 
impartiality, as well as the illusions of the adversaries, collapses” (Girard 46). Since there 
is no doubt that the witches lack impartiality, the only remaining aspect of tragedy left 
seemingly unaccounted is the presence of any “adversaries” in the text. Yet such 
adversaries also exist as part of the framework that develops early in Act 1 from which 
undifferentiation takes hold of the play. Once again stemming from the battle “lost and 
won,” it is clear that Macbeth is pitted in adversarial combat against the traitor Macdonald 
during the “fair” and “foul” day on which the play begins in spite of the witches’ language 
of undifferentiation. As the plot then unfolds, Macdonald is slain by Macbeth on the field 
of battle while Duncan subsequently orders execution upon Cawdor. The deaths of 
Macdonald and Cawdor not only mark the end of their individual mimetic desires—more 
aptly described as the “illusions” that Girard references—but also the end of the essential 
early adversaries in the play. Thus, the collapse occurs from which tragedy then rises, not 
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only allowing undifferentiation and category erosion to remain possible and expand, but in 
doing so create the most striking early example of undifferentiation in Macbeth’s character. 
As previously argued, when Macbeth is in conflict with Duncan’s enemies, he is 
practicing the sacrificial ritual which retains Scotland’s harmony and equilibrium. Yet what 
is a warrior in a land a peace who is no longer called upon to practice such sacrificial 
violence? He is blurred, he is unneeded, and he is wholly incapable of differentiating 
himself from the warrior he is to the man of peace society demands he be. Such is 
Macbeth’s dilemma; his normative category erodes because of undifferentiation, and so he 
is no longer able to practice the beneficent sacrificial rites Osborne warns must at all times 
remain upheld. Consequently, Macbeth’s dilemma also marks the point at which his 
mimetic desire and subsequent rivalries take command of his life and begin to inform the 
crisis of degree seen later in the play. “Tragedy,” Girard so observes, “thus shares a 
fundamental experience with ritual. Both have advanced to the very brink of that terrible 
abyss wherein all differences disappear” (292), and tragedy “advances toward the truth in 
the face of reciprocal violence and while assuming the guise of reciprocal violence” (292). 
The appropriateness of the tragedy of Macbeth opening with the witches’ false 
impartiality and language of undifferentiation only continues to grow apparent as the play 
continues. Still even within the first Act, such pertinence is observable in Act 1, Scene 3 
shortly after it begins. Entering into the Scene, Macbeth echoes the earlier undifferentiation 
of the witches by noting, “So foul and fair a day I have not seen” (Macbeth 1.3.36). Banquo, 
as then if on cue, compliments Macbeth’s echo by posing a brief interrogative. It is worth 
noting that the dynamic at work in the play between interrogatives and statements of 
undifferentiation or category erosion is less stringent and reliant upon chronology than the 
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dynamic between undifferentiation and the crisis of degree. The latter demands that 
undifferentiation come before the crisis of degree; yet the former is hindered by no such 
condition. Rather, what is apparent is that a statement of undifferentiation or category 
erosion is often followed closely by an interrogative, and vice versa. In Act 1, Scene 3 
alone, two further examples of that phenomenon exist merely lines apart. In both examples, 
it is Banquo’s language that serves to instigate the dynamic. The less important of the two 
examples is as follows: 
BANQUO. …If you can look into the seeds of time 
 And say which grain will grow and which will not, 
 Speak then to me, who neither beg nor fear 
 Your favours nor your hate. 
FIRST WITCH. Lesser than Macbeth, and greater.  
SECOND WITCH. Not so happy, yet much happier. (1.3.56-64) 
Here, the interplay between Banquo and the witches begins with Banquo’s interrogative 
appeal to know his future. Yet what seems a simple question on Banquo’s part manifests 
as a multifaceted display of undifferentiation. For Banquo to neither “beg” nor “fear” a 
response from the witches, which is otherwise to neither “desire” nor “abhor” their answer, 
is a combination of stark opposites; similarly, Banquo’s lack conviction over whether he 
would rather receive the witches’ “favour” or their “hate” is equal instance of nonsensical 
undifferentiation. Further, when the witches, always remaining exemplars of 
undifferentiated language, hail Banquo as both “lesser” and “greater” than Macbeth, as 
both “not so happy” and “happier,” the undifferentiation and category erosion is just as 
correspondingly apparent. When such a quantity of undifferentiation is present within such 
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a small number of lines, it is little wonder why Girard so gravely argues that “language 
itself is put in jeopardy” (Girard 51) when differences become indistinguishable. 
The remaining example deals intimately with what may be considered the most 
infamous example of category erosion already explored in Macbeth. Indeed, such erosion, 
the complete loss of normative sexual identity, is a topic that has already been made 
eminently apparent by numerous scholars who have studied the text. Regardless, herein it 
is significantly less important to determine what constitutes “normal sexuality” in the play 
or whether certain characters seem indisposed toward the stereotypical gender traits of one 
particular sex; rather, the only language of sexual identity that bears any consequence is 
the language showing the undifferentiation of category erosion. Truly, it is as Girard 
contends: normative sexuality “is too trivial to provoke internal violence” (221), and as 
such its capacity for study is nonexistent in the realm of undifferentiation. The passage of 
Banquo’s language reads as follows: 
—What are these, 
So withered, and so wild in their attire, 
That look not like th’inhabitants o’th’ earth 
And yet are on’t?—Live you, or are you aught 
That man may question? You seem to understand me 
By each at once her choppy finger laying 
Upon her skinny lip. You should be women, 
And yet your beards forbid me to interpret 
That you are so. (Macbeth 1.3.37-45) 
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In regard to the dynamic between interrogatives and statements of undifferentiation or 
category erosion, Banquo’s language not only once again begins with an interrogative but 
is supplemented by numerous interrogatives more throughout his speech. Ironically, the 
language employed in his very questions resonates with undifferentiation. When he notes 
how the witches “look not like the inhabitants of the earth and yet are on it,” he is 
unwittingly drawing attention to two aspects of the witches that blur them categorically. 
The first aspect is that even though they appear to be natural, they are in fact supernatural; 
and the second aspect is that, because they are supernatural, their presence in the natural 
world is improper. Supernatural beings should inhabit a supernatural world. Since the 
witches are supernatural beings in natural Scotland, their very manifestation upon the 
blighted heath is an irreconcilable show of undifferentiation. The notion is further 
perpetuated when Banquo asks the witches if they even live, and whether they are “aught 
that man may question.” The very act viewing and questioning the witches as Banquo is 
doing implies the proper answer; and yet that Banquo does not recognize the inherent truth 
denotes his inability to accurately categorize the witches amongst the living or the dead, or 
the real or the unreal. 
Most strikingly, and precisely in accordance with the language of sexual identity 
that bears consequence in the play, is Banquo’s inability to determine the gender of the 
witches. In spite of his continued usage of the adjective “she” when describing the witches, 
Banquo is absolutely clear that he cannot refer to them as women because the beards they 
wear forbid it. Additionally, Macbeth, who remains silent until Banquo’s speech is through, 
only further solidifies the categorical confusion by bidding the witches, “Speak, if you can. 
What are you?” (1.3.49), so that they will affirm their gender outright. When Macbeth 
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attempts to question the witches again soon afterward, he refers to them as being “imperfect 
speakers” (1.3.68), which is perhaps more aptly rendered into modern English as 
“incomplete speakers,” and which either way denotes the same appropriate sense of 
categorical erosion that renders the witches inadequate, half-finished, and distinguishably 
defective. Thus, while the text clearly illustrates the witches are beings quite unlike 
Macbeth or Banquo, the language of neither man is able to articulate as much; they cannot 
hope to render differentiation between themselves and the witches until the witches 
themselves are first rendered distinguishable. 
If there is one thing Act 1, Scene 3 makes abundantly clear, it is that the witches in 
all ways defy proper categorical distinguishability. Such active defiance not only makes 
them paradigms of undifferentiation, but it helps to demonstrate just how “dangerous” 
characters who possess erosive qualities precisely are in a Girardian society. True to form, 
the final particularly fascinating aspect of the witches’ undifferentiation in the Scene both 
maintains their indistinguishableness and reveals their more dangerous side. Within the 
witches’ opening banter, the language they employ is indicative of the animal imagery seen 
in numerous other Shakespeare plays. While the Second Witch is busy “Killing swine” 
(1.3.2), the First Witch is planning to take the form of “a rat without a tail” (1.3.8) in order 
to punish a sea captain, the “master o’th’ Tiger” (1.3.6), because of his wife’s indiscretion. 
The ostensibly simple and all but forgettable nature of this event belies the glaring degree 
of undifferentiation and category erosion it presents. That the First Witch intends to 
actually alter her bodily form, for example, is exceptionally critical. As Girard argues, the 
“loss of distinction between man and beast…is always linked to violence” (Girard 128). It 
does not matter that the First Witch merely plans to torture the sea captain by keeping him 
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awake for well over a year (Macbeth 1.3.17-22), because the very act against him is 
intended to cause him harm without having a beneficent intention for society, and thus it 
is a form of destructive violence. Further, if the witches already exude a sense of 
indistinguishableness due to of their other qualities, then the ability to voluntarily change 
their very appearance only succeeds in adding a new element of undifferentiation to their 
characters. It is difficult enough to define the supernatural when it sees fit to remain in a 
single form; it is impossible to define the supernatural when it changes its forms. Moreover, 
it is interesting to note that the animal interplay in the Scene is additionally indicative of 
category erosion insomuch as the outcome of the conflict between the “animals” is 
unexpected. The Secord Witch gives the First “a wind” (1.3.10) in order to assist the First 
in her foul purpose, and in that way the “swine” and the “rat” overcome the “tiger” in order 
to punish him; a more ludicrous outcome there is none. 
If the descent into the realm of categorical erosion through the language of sexual 
identity is so easy traversable in regard to the witches, then Macbeth’s own descent is no 
more difficult to traverse. Like the androgynous hags, Macbeth is a character for whom 
most descriptive language is a gateway to undifferentiation. To that end, the sheer number 
of ways Macbeth is describable erodes any semblance of who he truly is in the play. 
Macbeth ultimately enacts the roles of the Warrior, the King, the Girardian scapegoat, and 
the enforcer of sacrificial rite, among others, and thus the very notion of a singular 
“Macbeth” in the play is a façade. Like the witches, he is shifting and multifarious, and 
while he may not outwardly alter his appearance as the witches do, his inward self is no 
less tumultuous. In regard to the erosive language of sexual identity, one finds that Macbeth 
is equally disjointed. While the play’s other characters present a serviceable depiction of 
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his sexual identity by utilizing descriptive language to draw out the undifferentiation that 
so fittingly revolves about his character, it nevertheless remains Macbeth’s own forays into 
the space of self-description that stands testament to his disjointedness.  
The greatest examples of Macbeth’s self-description may be thought of as 
independent from one another, yet when brought together and juxtaposed appropriately, 
such descriptions show how undifferentiated Macbeth’s sexual identity is in the play, and 
therefore how undifferentiated he himself is. Beginning late in Act 1, Scene 7, Macbeth 
endeavors to shield himself from the chastising of Lady Macbeth over his sudden spell of 
apprehension at finally being inescapably faced with an opportunity to murder Duncan by 
stating, “I dare do all that may become a man; / Who dares do more is none” (1.7.46-47). 
That Macbeth’s language directly implies that one may utilize action to “become a man” 
is significant, as it is an idea he will reiterate shortly afterward in Act 2, Scene 3, once his 
houseguests discover Duncan’s murder. In order to appease the shock of his guests, 
Macbeth’s council is that they should all of them endeavor to “briefly put on manly 
readiness” (2.3.129). Once again, Macbeth’s language suggests that an action—or at the 
very least what stands metaphorically as an action—is the gateway into a masculine 
disposition. With that in mind, it is then quite curious that in Act 3, Scene 1, the language 
of action takes a decidedly feminine turn in regard to Macbeth’s self-description. In the 
Scene, when Macbeth is soliloquizing about his sovereignly insecurities, he notes how the 
witches have “hailed [Banquo] father to a line of kings” (3.1.61). In regard to another, the 
language of action is still masculine; Banquo is a “father” rather than a “mother” to a line 
of “kings” rather than a line of “queens.” Yet in regard to himself, Macbeth states, “Upon 
my head they placed a fruitless crown, / And put a barren scepter in my grip” (3.1.62-63). 
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Now the language of action that Macbeth employs is wholly indicative of feminine 
impotence rather than masculinity. 
What may thus be drawn from the juxtaposition of Macbeth’s self-description is 
that he at all times wishes to utilize “action” as the catalyst for his own masculinity; yet 
action itself does not offer Macbeth the uniform representation of manhood that he seeks 
due to its own dual nature. Action may be masculine, but it may equally be feminine. 
Macbeth’s language is able to denote the difference, but his actual character is never 
capable of acknowledging it. Further, the Girardian model considers Macbeth’s reliance 
upon action a viable path leading to undifferentiation, specifically because it does not 
succeed. As Girard contends, “the representation of nondifference ultimately becomes the 
very exemplar of difference” (Girard 64). Since Macbeth does not possess the ability to tell 
masculine and feminine actions apart, his very purpose of utilizing such actions in an 
undifferentiated manner only succeeds in differentiating him from those individuals who 
may be considered his masculine peers. Men like Banquo, the “father” who begets “kings,” 
or Macduff, who is a “man that’s of a woman born” (Macbeth 5.8.14). In turn, since 
Macbeth is differentiated from his fellow men, he simultaneously becomes an 
undifferentiated being whose gender category is eroded once again. He is then in such a 
capacity as to be similar to the witches insomuch as he appears as a creature whose sexual 
identity is indistinguishable; yet he is also then dissimilar to the witches, for while his lack 
of identity may render him an undifferentiated blur of a character, it does not have the 
power to render him supernatural. The application of the undifferentiation at work in this 
near-cyclical interaction of “same” and “not same” is quite rare in the Girardian model, 
and as Osborne suggests, is typically observable only in regard to a particular “example of 
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likeness, [such as] in twins or in marked similarities” (Osborne 337). Macbeth’s reliance 
on action is indeed reminiscent of such likeness or marked similarity. As such, whether his 
language is participating in the dynamic between interrogatives and statements of 
undifferentiation or category erosion, or whether it is alluding to his multiple roles in his 
own play as Warrior, King, Girardian scapegoat, or the enforcer of sacrificial rite by means 
of “action,” it will always be suggestive that there is no such thing as a single “Macbeth.” 
In this play, there is nothing more dangerous. 
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CHAPTER V 
Conclusion: “Be bloody, bold, and resolute” 
 
That the scholarly community at large has not yet seen fit to usher the tragedy of 
Macbeth into the discourse of Girardian study as it has such other plays as King Lear, or 
Julius Caesar, or those of the Henriad is an unfortunate oversight, yet it is also a distinct 
opportunity. The thoughts and observations about Macbeth which have been herein 
discussed only constitute the foundational beginnings of what yet might be discovered and 
articulated about the play. By undertaking a literary expedition to uncover such knowledge, 
one indelibly sets out upon a quest to grant readers and scholars alike a new lens through 
which to explore the play that has until now been otherwise unavailable. René Girard 
himself began such an expedition first in his Violence and the Sacred, and later in his A 
Theatre of Envy: William Shakespeare, in order to show how even the most seemingly 
harmless example of sacrifice in Shakespeare’s works can ultimately lead to dire 
consequences as those works unfold; yet for better or worse, Girard left Macbeth free of 
his insight so that it might now be deconstructed, investigated, and affixed to the concepts 
present within his sacrificial model by whichever kindred spirits deem the endeavor 
worthwhile. Consequently, then, if there is but one thing to be learned from the tragedy of 
56 
Macbeth, one lesson that might help gather momentum for further scholarship, it is a lesson 
that Girard so sagely intones: “The slightest outbreak of violence can bring about a 
catastrophic escalation” (30). Whosoever takes up the study of Macbeth would do well to 
keep such a notion in mind; and just as the prophetic spirit who grants counsel to Macbeth 
suggests the Black King be courageous and unyielding in his purpose, so too should all 
who would continue the work herein begun exhibit such tenacity of disposition as to be 
bloody, bold, and resolute. 
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